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PREFACE 
The University of Winnipeg was the location of a major national urban 
studies conference, hosted by the Institute of U:rDan Studies in August 1985. 
The "canadian U:rDan Studies Conference" addressed the general theme of "The 
canadian U:rDan Experience - Past and Present. II More than ninety specialists 
spoke during forty separate sessions on such topics as housing and the built 
environment, economic and conmnmity development, planning and urban fonn, 
women and the urban envirornnent, and urban government and politics. 
This publication is a result of the canadian U:rDan Studies Conference. The 
Institute of U:rDan Studies is publishing many of the papers presented at the 
conference in the Institute's publication series. Same of the papers will 
also appear in the scholarly journal, the U:rDan History Review/Revue 
d 'histoire u:rba.ine and in book fonn. 
This conference represented a major effort on the part of the Institute of 
Urban studies in tenns of fulfilling its role as a national centre of 
excellence in the urban studies and housing fields. 
Alan F .J. Artibise 
Director 
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1.0 INTROIVCITON 
The starting point for this paper is a study of the politics of downtown 
revitalization schemes in canada, a study which is intended, on the one hand, 
to consider the policy and planning issues .iiwolved in such schemes, and, on 
the other, to ask how they are affecting the character of nnm.icipal 
goverrnnent. When I began the study, the hypothesis was that nnm.icipal 
governments, already seriously weakened by earlier events, were being further 
weakened by the senior government intavention which goes with downtown 
revitalization. In pursuing the study, I have begun to question that 
hypothesis as examination indicates at least some case can be made for the 
suggestion that nnm.icipal goverrnnents are more active, indeed innovative, in 
downtown revitalization than they were earlier-for example in expressway 
disputes ( 1) --and that downtown revitalization could prove to be a stimulant of 
nnm.icipal revitalization. 
However, there is a prior problem. The strength and weakness of nnm.icipal 
goverrnnent cannot be debated in the absence of a theory about what constitutes 
strength and weakness. We do not have such a theory. Indeed, good theories 
of any kind about canadian nnm.icipal institutions--or those of other 
countries-are in short supply. Instead, there are a jUillble of half-theories, 
about .responsible goverrnnent, responsive government, public access and public 
choice. Each of these are enlightening in themselves, but we have yet to have 
a dialogue about how they relate to each other, what the advantages of each 
are and what the tradeoffs are among them. These shortcomings lead to another 
embarrassment: though university teachers and researchers of urban politics 
come as close as anyone to being in nnm.icipal affairs, we find it difficult to 
produce useful advice. Each nnm.icipal refonn has its own theory, usually half 
articulated, or not articulated at all. There is no serious literature which 
tries to make these theories explicit, relate them to each other and test 
them. 
The attempt to develop a theory 'Which deals meaningfully with urban 
institutional and policy questions, while relating them to each other, takes 
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us beyond the existing literature and poses some interesting challenges. The 
project builds on the provocative questions raised by John Dearlove in that it 
nnderlines his repeated charge that IllUch of the municipal literature is 
lacking in seriousness, being built on wishful thinking and resistance to 
change instead of theo:ry and fact. (2) His book offered some wonderfully clear 
and trenchant criticisms of the literature of municipal political and 
management reorganization, as well as a thought-provoking discussion of the 
factors which need to be considered in the development of more adequate 
analyses. But that was seven years ago, and his book will remain a curiosity 
if it does not inspire the development of a more critical literature of 
IllUnicipal reorganization. The attempt in these pages to define what 
constitutes weak and strong municipal government, and to indicate the 
structural requisites for each, constitutes a critical analysis of municipal 
structures. It is intended in part to help us produce better studies of 
municipal reorganization. 
Thus, this study is compatible with the fonndations laid by Dearlove, but 
it is bound to enconnter resistance elsewhere, for in some quarters, the study 
of municipal organization is treated as some kind of relic from the 
discredited past, which we have thankfully left behind. Paul Peterson, for 
exarrg;:>le, curtly dismisses such studies on the first page of the preface of one 
of his books(3) with the following words: "· .• After World War II the study of 
local government was able to transcend its traditional concern with 
administrative efficiency and structural refonns and consider questions of 
central concern .... 11 In the American academic world, structural refonns may 
be out of fashion, but in the municipal world of canada, England and the 
United States, as well as elsewhere, the search for appropriate institutions 
remains a ve:ry real problem, and one which academics, with their perpetually 
unresolved disputes over nntested theories are doing little or nothing to help 
solve. In this paper a theo:ry is developed which will be more useful than our 
existing ones in the design of municipal institutions. It is helpful to begin 
by taking stock of the municipal theories already available. Thus we begin by 
looking at three which have been influential in canada. A brief discussion 
will serve to underline Dear love 1 s contention that, like so IllUch of the 
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:municipal literature, they leave much to be desired. 
2. 0 THEORIES AOOUT MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 
2 .1 Responsible Government 
Perhaps the most influential and controversial theory about canadian 
:municipal government in recent years has been the idea, associated especially 
with the names of Meyer Brovmstone and Allan O'Brien, that the parliamentary 
or responsible government model is the most appropriate way of achieving 
strong, social-democratically oriented :municipal government in larger urban 
areas. ( 4) But the theory behind this idea has not been worked out, and the 
question of how it can be tested has not been addressed at all. One result is 
that we do not know "What we actually mean by responsible government at the 
:municipal level. For example, how does one deal with the fact that a quasi-
prime ministerial role for the Mayor makes her or him unavailable to represent 
a constituency? It has been argued that this is a more important problem at 
the :municipal level than it is at senior levels, because municipal politicians 
have a more important role in dealing with the minutiae of their constituents' 
day-to-day problems. There is, it is argued, more likely to be a conflict of 
interest between a Mayor's city wide concern and those of the citizens of a 
ward hejshe represents than would be the case with a Premier's or Prime 
Minister's Head-of-Government and constituency duties. And "What about the 
government standing or falling on the confidence of the legislature? Both the 
Unicity White Paper and the Taraska Report ignored this feature of responsible 
government, even though it is central, not only to the canadian system of 
government, but also to other parliamentary party systems. If it is important 
to include other responsible government features in municipal government, then 
why not this one? And if it is included, who will assume the role of the 
Monarch when a government falls? These and other questions have not been 
answered because we have not fully worked out a theory of responsible 
government at the municipal level. 
It might well be argued that these are questions of detail, which could be 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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worked out easily enough. A more difficult problem grows out of the failure 
to address the question of hOW' the validity of the claims on behalf of 
responsible goverrnnent can be tested. A good way of posing this problem is by 
asking the follOW'ing question: what evidence would be sufficient to prove 
that municipal parliamentary goverrnnent has failed? Winni:peg Unicity is the 
closest thing in canadian cities to parliamentary goverrnnent and most 
conrrnentators are disenchanted with it. It is argued that Winni:peg' s 
goverrnnent is not noticeably more responsive or more activist in tackling 
major policy issues than other municipal goverrnnents. Defenders of Unicity 
point to the fact that the scheme lacks some of the reconrrnended 
"Parliamentary" institutions, but it is difficult to get around the fact that 
several of the reconrrnended refo:rrnS have been implemented, apparently without 
producing any noticeable improvements. Does that mean, then, that the theory 
was wrong? If not, why not, and hOW' will we knOW' it if the responsible 
goverrnnent theory ever does fail? 'Ihese are crucially important questions. 
If we do not have answers to them, or at least a method for answering them, 
how can we offer advice about nn.micipal goverrnnent? We return to this 
question later. 
2.2 Local Autonomy vs. Centralization 
A different, but related, body of theory is the debate over the character 
of local goverrnnent, which has been a staple of university classes in canadian 
nn.micipal politics. (5) In this debate, George I.angrod contends--with I.eo 
Moulin offering some qualified support-that genuine democracy is possible 
only at the senior levels of goverrnnent, because democracy "is by definition 
an egalitarian, majority and unitarian system." (6) 'Iheir concept of 
democracy, which is clearly in the social-democratic tradition, is opposed by 
Keith Panter-Brick, who argues for what he calls a "liberal"--as opposed to 
"egalitarian"--perspective. (7) In effect, both sides in this debate disagree 
with the BrOW'nstonejO'Brien position that neither sees a chance for strong, 
social-democratic goverrnnent at the local level. Panter-Brick, who advocates 
a substantial role for local goverrnnent, obviously does so in part because he 
sees relative local autonomy as an antidote to interventionist goverrnnent in 
the social-democratic manner. I.angrod wished to limit the scope of local 
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government precisely because of his desire to promote that type of government. 
The trouble with these articles, suggestive as they are, is two-fold: they 
deal in prononncements VJhich are neither verifiable nor falsifiable and they 
operate on a very general level. Both lines of argument seem plausible enough 
and their plausibility is heightened by the fact that they seem to agree on a 
central proposition, namely that local government is incompatible with 
egalitarian democracy. They disagree only on the question of "Whether local 
government is a good thing. But neither side shows much concern with 
explaining "What their ideas mean in detail or with testing their validity. 
Specifically, "What institutional arrangements are Panter-Brick or Iangrod 
advocating? What degree of autonomy does the fanner favour, "What degree of 
centralization does the latter consider desireable? HO'itl will we knO'itl the 
governments VJhich they respectively advocate "When we see them? What 
historical or current cases can we investigate in an attetrg;)t to detennine the 
validity of their prononncements? What would they accept as sufficient 
evidence to prove them wrong? They do not offer us much help in addressing 
these questions. They offer ex cathedera prononncements on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis. 
2.3 Public Choice 
Another school of thought with relevance to canadian municipal politics 
poses a different problem. Public choice theorists have done a good job of 
clearly specifying at least some of the municipal institutions they favour, 
and they have shown a laudable concern with finding ways of testing their 
ideas. In their advocacy of government VJhich is as limited as possible, and 
"Which is characterized by fragmentation and duplication of se:rvices in order 
to imitate competitive market conditions, they pose a radical, clear and 
challenging alternative to social-democratic ideas, both of the IangrodjMoulin 
and of the Brownstone/O'Brien variety. OUr problem with this theo:ry is not 
clarifying it, or elaborating it, but deciding "What to do with it. Those of 
us "Who are not prepared to accept it holus-bolus have to decide how we can 
argue the case against it or, alternatively, VJhich elements of it we can 
accept and integrate into our way of thinking. Most canadian commentators on 
municipal affairs-like many American municipal traditionalists-have dealt 
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with the public choice challenge by ignoring it and hoping it will go away. 
In the meantime, the thrust toward strong municipal goverrrrnent 'Which has been 
spearheaded by Brownstone, 0' Brien and others shows signs of dissipating. At 
the same time, municipal goverrrrnents are starting to contract out more of 
their work 'While provincial goverrrrnents begin to take a more beneficent 
attitude toward private schools--developments 'Which suggest a growing 
acceptance of public choice ideas. If advocates of strong goverrrrnent are not 
careful, public choice will have transformed their world before they even get 
around to formulating their position clearly. 
2.4 Toward a Theory 
In the remainder of this paper, we look at some proposals for a theory 
about municipal institutions 'Which is testable and 'Which will help us to 
understand the alternatives available to us and to choose among them. In 
order to keep the task to manageable proportions, the paper focuses on the 
question of strength and weakness: how can we distinguish between strong and 
weak municipal goverrrrnents? What factors must we consider in choosing between 
them? How strong or weak are our current municipal goverrrrnents and how did 
they get that way? What are the possibilities for the future? My bias is in 
favour of strong, interventionist goverrrrnent, and I would prefer municipal 
goverrrrnents more autonomous than the ones we have. However, although my bias 
unavoidably influences the questions I ask and answers I find plausible, my 
objective is not to find arguments in support of my opinions, but rather to 
find out 'Whether my opinions, as well as other people's, can be confirmed or 
proven wrong and how they must be modified if they are to stand on finner 
ground. I am hoping that this paper--with the help of the reactions they 
stimulate, and the modifications 'Which are made in response to those 
reactions--will make a contribution toward putting the kind of work Brownstone 
and O'Brien have done on a more scientific basis, and will move us a little 
bit away from the kind of purely subjective opinion-slinging we find in the 
articles of I.angrod, Panter-Brick and Moulin. 
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3. 0 MUNICIPAL STRENG'IH, MUNICIPAL WEAKNESS 
Both Weberian and Marxian thought--as well as the empirical orientation 
characteristic of American political science-have influenced the material 
being presented here. It is useful to begin this section with a brief sketch 
of Weber's notion of the ideal type, ( 8) 'Which offers an approach to the 
classification of strong and weak fonns of municipal government. An ideal 
type includes both ideas and modes of action vmich are assembled out of 
empirical data, but put together in such a way that each type represents a 
quintessential state of affairs, an extreme version of reality. For example, 
two of Weber's ilnportant ideal types are traditional authority and legal 
authority, the first of 'Which characterizes patriarchial and patrimonial 
societies, 'While the second characterizes modern bureaucratic societies. 
Neither of these types is likely to be found in its pure state. 'Ihe value of 
them is that they offer points of reference 'Which can be used for pm:poses of 
classification. We can imagine a scale, at one extreme of 'Which is a 
quintessential traditional society and at the other a. purely bureaucratic one. 
'Ihe actual societies can then be classified according to the degree to vmich 
they approximate one or the other ideal type, and a comparison of them can be 
used to plot trends and to shO'iN what happens as a trend proceeds. Weber used 
these concepts to trace the path of social change on a very broad historical 
canvas. I propose to use the same notion on a much more modest scale to plot 
the trends toward weak and strong fonns of government 'Which are observable 
over the past century of Canadian municipal history and to ask where we are 
now and where we could be headed. We begin with definitions, descriptions and 
brief discussions of one strong-government and two weak-government ideal 
types. 'Ihe concepts out of 'Which these ideal types are constructed are not 
news to students of municipal government. 'Ihe contribution this paper makes 
is an attempt to organize them more rigorously, so that they can be used in 
scientific investigation. (See appendix for a tabular summary of the ideal 
types). 
3.1 Strong Government 
Strong local government maybe defined as a government capable of acting to 
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reflect the views of its constituents on major issues and to bring about 
changes mandated by the constituents. Several things need to be noted about 
this definition. '!he ideology it reflects is a broadly social democratic view 
of pluralist wlitics within the responsible government tradition. Its 
starting-point is a fundamentally optimistic view of government, an asst.mq;Jtion 
that a government is capable of worthwhile achievements. Accordingly, it 
holds--here the British responsible government tradition become apparent--that 
an effective government has to have the power to act. It accepts the 
pluralist/democratic assumption that such power should be wielded in pursuit 
of a popular mandate. Its social democratic elements are visible in the idea 
that government power is reflected in making changes, getting things done, 
intervening in the society or the econo:tey". 
'Ihe reader may ask-as critics of earlier drafts of this paper have--why 
the elements of the ideal-type are assembled as they are, and not in some 
other way. Why, for example, is there an association between responsible 
government and social democracy? Is there not as good a case to be made for 
disassociating the two as for associating them? Responsible government, after 
all, is a hoary British tradition whose origins have nothing at all to do with 
social democracy. My answer to this line of questioning comes in two parts. 
In the first place, the ideal types are not ideal in the sense of "valid for 
all time, " but in the Weberian sense of representing a summary of a wide range 
of e:rt'!Pirical observable phenomena. 'Ihe e:rt'!Pirical referent for this paper is 
canadian urban history of the past century. In that period, it is quite 
clear, that opposition to social democratic trends in urban politics has 
generally been associated with opposition to strong-government institutions. 
In future, things may change, just as Weber's legal traditional dichotomy may 
not be valid for all time. later in the paper, possible realignments in the 
foreseeable future are suggested involving a partial reconciliation of social-
democratic and public choice ideas. 
'Ihe second part of my answer suggests a significance for the typology set 
out in this paper which extends beyond canadian nnmicipal history: although 
responsible government in its time-honoured British sense has no association 
with social democracy, one can argue that responsible government was 
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transfonned by Britain's entry into the age of mass democracy. If for 
example, modern Britain is corrpared to modern America, a case can be made 
that responsible goverrnnent has a stronger association with social democracy 
than America's institutions. 
In practical tenns, then, strong nn.micipal goverrnnent institutions are 
composed of elements derived from the British responsible goverrnnent model: 
single-member constituencies, representation by population, a large council, a 
party system, a mayor or other political executive responsible to council, and 
a set of arrangements, analogous to cabinet, which allow council to supervise 
the administration and exercise control over it. Strong goverrnnent advocates 
also favour metropolitan amalgamation. The most rigorous canadian attempt to 
turn this model into a reality began with the Manitoba Goverrnnent's 1970 
White Paper on Unicity, (9) which was ilnplemented in part. The 1976 Taraska 
Committee Report(10) was another foray in pursuit of the sarne objectives. A 
British attempt along similar lines was the Maud Committee Report. ( 11) 
Recent refonns in Edmonton, although less rigorously attuned to the British 
model, are also oriented toward the establishment of strong nn.micipal 
goverrnnent in the sense of the definition proposed here. The moves in various 
canadian cities to substitute ward systems for at-large electoral systems (as 
well as Edmonton's more cautious InOVe from an at-large system to multi-member 
wards) are more modest attempts to apply what I arn calling strong-goverrnnent 
principles, because they involve attempts to make council more directly 
responsive to the electorate and thereby increase its legitimacy and 
authority. Similarly, the longer-tenn trend, visible in most cities, toward 
the assertion of council authority over separate boards, commissions and 
authorities is a strong-goverrnnent trend. 
3. 2 Weak Goverrnnent 
In order to characterize the ideological and social basis of weak 
goverrnnent we leave the British tradition and turn to the American one, where 
goverrnnent, far from being seen as a friend capable of doing good if empowered 
to do so, is seen as a necessary evil, a potential tyrant to be feared and 
carefully controlled. Weak goverrnnent shares the liberal/pluralist tradition 
with strong goverrnnent, but rejects the notion of political control--over the 
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administration, the econOiey" or the society--in favour of that of controlling 
politicians. The notion that a strong government can achieve worthwhile ends 
is rejected as idealistic. Government is required to perform certain 
functions which cannot be perfonned privately, but its power must be strictly 
limited. Politicians are seen less as representatives than as potential 
demagogues whose power must be limited. That government is best which governs 
least. 
In concrete institutional terms, weak government takes two forms: a 
moderate one, based on longstanding tradition, which we can call separation of 
powers and a newer, radical one--the true e:mbodllnent of weak government 
principles--called public choice. Under separation of powers-as we find it 
at the municipal level--the American aversion to strong government has 
manifested itself primarily in suspicion of the power of elected 
representatives, who are deemed (not without justification, at least in the 
past) to be prone to corruption and mismanagement. Their position has been 
weakened by limiting the size of council, keeping it non-partisan, giving some 
of its powers to semi-independent boards and commissions, providing for 
council to be elected at large and, of course, maintaining a separation of 
powers between the mayor and council. These arrangements have the effect of 
limiting the power of councillors 1) to organize a broad popular base of 
support, 2) to organize themselves so that they can control council and 3) to 
establish control over the administration of municipal affairs. A strong 
government advocate would see these limitations as a restriction on the 
ability of politicians to represent the public in an effective manner. A weak 
government advocate sees them as safeguards against politicians' predictable 
penchant for manipulating the masses and dominating public affairs. 
The suspicion of ward- and party-based political power which is evident in 
separation-of-powers principles is not matched, however, by a similarly severe 
attitude toward mayoral and administrative power. Thus we often find that the 
same people who advocate small councils want them to play a minimal board-of-
directors role, and oppose party politics, also support strong-mayor 
arrangements, strengthened administration, and metropolitan or regional 
government schemes. The support of strong mayors is justified by the argument 
ll 
that the conduct of municipal affairs requires competent leadership. Powerful 
bureaucracies are rationalized with the contention t..'J.mt municipal affairs are 
a matter of routine administration and that administrative power will 
therefore enhance efficiency and effectiveness without raising the question of 
excessive political power. 
To a true believer in weak goverrnnent, this is pretty thin soup. From a 
rigourous weak-government perspective--a public choice point of view--
separation-of-powers arrangements are at best a mealy-mouthed compromise with 
strong-goverrnnent principles, as well as a rationalization for arrangements 
which limit real decision-making power to a small elite. Thus Bish and Ostrom 
refer with an almost palpable sneer to municipal goverrnnent arrangements 
" ... in which the focus is on strengthening the authority of knowledgeable, 
benevolent leaders to determine all subo:rdi.nate interests." ( 12) With an 
iconoclastic flourish, they counter municipal conventional wisdom about the 
evils of fragmentation and duplication with the following statement: "If 
ample fragmentation of authority and overlapping jurisdictions exist, 
sufficient competition may be engendered to stimulate a more responsive and 
efficient public economy in metropolitan areas." (13) As the quote implies, 
public choice sees municipal functions primarily as service provision and 
advocates market-like competition among jurisdictions as a way of securing 
efficient and effective delivery of services. The institutional means to that 
end offers an alternative to strong government which is more radical, hence 
more clearcut, than separation of powers. Public choice advocates oppose 
municipal amalgamation, party politics and all forms of centralized power. 
They argue that government should consist of a multiplicity of fragmented 
jurisdictions which overlap and compete with each other and which, in 
addition, are subject, wherever possible, to competition from the private 
sector. In theory at least, public choice is the most consistent, 
thoroughgoing manifestation of the American ideal of a government tamed and 
held in check, a government which governs as little as possible. 
3.3 Evaluation and ApPlication 
If the framework sketched above is worth anything, we will know it by the 
fact that it helps us to organize and clarify our thinking, ultimately to 
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understand :municipal government better, and to be more effective in charting 
paths of adaptation and change for it. I have found that it is helpful, 
indeed I developed and refined it in self-defense against the welter of 
apparently unrelated infomation which it is Iqy duty to present each year in 
what students generally regard as the most boring part of Iqy introductory city 
politics course: 'Ihe Baldwin Act, the refom. movement at the turn of the 
century, council-city manager, council-committee, council-city conunissioner, 
urban and regional refom. and all the rest. My framework seems to me to help 
make sense of our urban/municipal history, to offer some indication of the 
directions in which we are headed now, and, not incidentally, to make the 
whole thing a little more interesting. We turn, therefore, to urban 
history. ( 14) 
4.0 HIS'IORY 
'Ihe fact that the weak govennnentjstrong government frame work is 
structured as a pair of ideal types in the Weberian manner makes them 
particularly useful as a tool for the understanding of historical trends. 
strong government/weak government, like Weber's traditional authority/legal 
authority dichotomy, represents the theoretical extremes on a continuum that 
reflects reality. 'Ihere is no society which fits perfectly either the model 
of traditional authority, or that of legal authority, but elements of both are 
obse:rvable in actual societies, and, in a historical review, it is possible to 
observe how societies have been transfonned from primarily traditional 
societies to primarily bureaucratic ones. 'Ihe same observations apply to the 
strong govennnentjweak government dichotomy, except that it is-as we noted--
constructed on a more modest scale. Neither strong govennnent nor weak 
govennnent exists in its pure fom., at least in canada, but each represents a 
set of ideas about :municipal organization, a model which is both a theoretical 
possibility and an ideal that various political groups have, at various times, 
sought to make a reality. By observing the degree to which canadian :municipal 
institutions have, over the years, approximated each of these ideals, we can 
map out the course of :municipal history in tem.s which are theoretically as 
well as politically meaningful. 
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4 .1 The Refonn Movement 
If we view canadian municipal histo:ry as a tug-of-war between weak-
goverrnnent and strong-goverrnnent impulses, the pivotal event in that histo:ry 
is the refonn movement at the turn of the centu:ry. Although similar refonn 
movements took place in canada and the United States during that period, it is 
canadian municipal institutions which were more drastically affected, because, 
in canada, the refonn movement coincided with our first serious spurt of urban 
growth, with the result that the ideas of the refonn movement were the 
dominant influence in building our institutions from the ground up. In the 
United States, the newly developing cities of the south and west were 
similarly affected as a rule, while cities of the north and east, having 
already established municipal institutions, were generally less drastically 
affected. (15) 
What was the character of this refonn movement which had such a drastic 
effect on canadian cities? To some limited degree, it was anti-democratic: 
it involved proposals for limitations of the franchise, as well as enhanced 
property qualifications for both the franchise and for political 
candidacy. (16) To the extent that it was, it is outside of the framework 
being presented in these pages because, as we have seen, the weak goverrnnent 
and strong goverrnnent ideal types both belong within the liberal-pluralist 
democratic tradition. However, the anti -democratic elements of the reform 
movement were a relatively peripheral part of the reform movement and did not, 
on the whole, exercise a lasting influence. (17) The most central and 
influential features of the refonn movement do fit into our framework: they 
belong into the weak-goverrnnent tradition, and specifically into the 
separation-of-powers variant of that tradition. Indeed, in some respects they 
virtually duplicate the ideal type. They are based on a suspicion of strong 
goverrnnent, one which, however, focuses on the evils of political control, 
while at the same time advocating strong administration. Refonners helped 
bring about stronger administration in the fonn of a professionalized 
municipal public service as well as modernized administrative organization and 
accounting. At the same time they took quintessential weak-
goverrnnentjseparation-of-powers measures in order to weaken politicians, and 
undennine their ability to offer their constituents the kind of representation 
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a strong-goverrnnent advocate would consider effective. 'Ihese measures 
included small councils, IIlUl ti -member wards or at-large systems, separate 
boards and commissions, and non-partisanship. 
4. 2 Confused Americanization 
Two very significant points emerge from this analysis. 'Ihe first is that 
canadian urban municipal institutions were-from their very origins-built on 
American principles rather than the British strong-goverrnnent idea which 
fonned the main basis for senior-level political institutions in canada. If 
anybody cares, it is a case of Americanization writ large, and virtually 
unnoticed. Although it was unnoticed--or, more likely because it was 
unnoticed--it took place to the acco:mpanirnent of confusion and ambivalence. 
As an example of the confusion, Ontario reformers touted the board of control 
system. as a form of cabinet goverrnnent at the municipal level. However, the 
board of control is elected at large and separately from the rest of council. 
It has the effect of dividing political power and weakening the aldermen, 'Who 
are more directly representative of neighbourhoods than the board is. In 
tenus of this analysis, it has more in common with the American senate than 
with a parliamentary cabinet. It furthers weak-goverrnnent principles and 
clearly undermines strong goverrnnent. (18) 
4. 3 Ambivalent Americanization 
In addition to the confusion, there was also ambivalence as canadian urban 
reformers grasped the American grail, but grasped it loosely. For example, 
the American city manager system. weakens council and strengthens the 
administration in classic weak-goverrnnent; separation-of-powers style. But 
canadian city managers have never attained the power of their American 
counterparts, partly because it goes against their parliamentary grain to 
sneer at politicians and humiliate them. the way their American colleagues 
occasionally do and partly because they lack the American managers 
unrestricted powers of appointlnent. Another example of ambivalence in the 
adaptation of American institutions is the canadian unwillingness to accept 
the idea of a strong mayor. It seems clear that fragmented political 
institutions like those of the Americans create a vacuum of political power. 
'Ihe American solution has been presidentialism at the federal level and strong 
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mayors in the municipalities. But we have generally chosen not to give mayors 
the executive authority and the veto power which seems an almost inescapable 
conclusion to the logic of separation of powers. For some reason, our 
responsible government conscience, which lies donnant while at-large electoral 
systems and separate boards and commissions are created, suddenly springs to 
life at the mention of a strong mayor, and we reject the idea. In this 
respect, it seems we have managed to saddle ourselves with the worst of both 
worlds: a system with fragmented political authority and weak leadership as 
well. OUr municipal institutions, then, have become seriously, if 
ambivalently, Americanized, though our awareness of this fact is somewhat 
nru.ddled. 
4.4 Municipal Folklore 
A second significant point which emerges from the weak-government/strong-
government analysis is that the weak-government ideas of the refonn movement 1 
in addition to bringing about a set of particular institutional changes, have 
created a conventional wisdom 'Which has become a pennanent part of the 
folklore of municipal government. The folklore--which expresses a distaste 
for political power at the municipal level, but does not convey a 
corresponding wariness about the dangers of administrative or private power-
is deeply rooted and is often repeated by people 'Who obviously have no idea of 
the implications of what they are saying. "Let's keep politics out of this" 
means "I.et' s keep it honest." A "non-political fonnn" is one marked by 
sincerity and straight talk. A "businesslike" approach is a good one, a 
"political" one is bad. "Administrative efficiency" is always preferable to 
"political interference. 11 All of these canards express the weak-government j 
separation-of-powers ideal: politicians should be kept weak, strong 
political control is undesireable and strong administration is 
desireable. These notions are of course part of our overall political lore 1 
not just that of municipal government, but they have a particular relevance 
for municipal government. 
4. 5 Continuing Influence 
More importantly, they have had a strong influence on the continuing course 
of municipal refonn. For example, the standard reaction to almost any 
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municipal problem has been the demand that it be "taken out of politics," 
given to "experts" in order to achieve "strong administration." The result 
has been the proliferation of separate boards and commissions, each of which 
has gone yet another step in the direction of weakened political control and 
weakened legitimacy of politicians and political structures. This point is 
widely understood and does not require elaboration, but it has been less 
widely remarked that metropolitan and regional schemes have generally lent 
weight to the weak-govennnentjseparation-of-J?OWers trend. As a rule, they 
feature indirect systems of representation and councils which are small in 
relation to the populations they are trying represent. That adds up to weak 
representation. The weak-govennnentjseparation-of-J?OWers picture which 
emerges is corrpleted by the strong administrative structures evident in metro 
Toronto and--to a lesser extent--in various other upper-tier municipal 
governments. The greater Vancouver regional district is an exception to the 
rule of strong administration, but it offers a particularly apt exa:rrple of the 
rule of weak political control. Therefore, although metropolitan and regional 
schemes were often touted as a new departure in municipal government and a 
break with the past, the reality is that they were a further extension of the 
weak-governmentjseparation-of-J?OWers ideas that grew out of the refonn 
movement at the turn of the century. They represented, not new ideas, but a 
continuation of existing trends. 
4. 6 The Enfeeblement of Municipal Government 
The trends we have been observing enfeebled the political side of municipal 
government and robbed it of its legitimacy. They have been exacerbated by a 
wider change which has affected all of society: the bureaucratization and 
accorrpanying centralization which was described by Weber. The combined effect 
upon municipal government of all these changes has been devastating. A 
century- ago, local authorities, either :municipal or charitable, were largely 
in control of what we today consider the most important government programs: 
welfare, health care and education. However, :municipal governments were not 
equal to the demands of the past half century for expanded government activity 
in these areas. Today, the role of local authorities in all these areas has 
been reduced to routine administration, while virtually all the important 
decisions are made at the senior levels of government. Even school boards, 
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which :maintain some pretence of autono:m,y, no longer have any significant say 
in such crucial matters as curriculum, choice of textbooks, and pupil-teacher 
ratios. The only major decisions still being made by local authorities are 
those relating to land use, and even in this area restrictions imposed and 
conditional funds offered by senior governments have made major inroads on 
local autono:m,y.(l9) 
Why have nn.micipal governments been reduced to little more than ciphers? 
Part of the reason is the one given by Weber: industrialization, urbanization 
and modern C011.1ltllll1ications produce centralized fonns of organization and 
require them in order to survive. Centralization is a concornmitant of modern 
society, and probably inevitably so. That, however, does not mean that 
virtually all important decision making need be centralized. It is clear, for 
example, that a mobile population and a market econo:m,y will benefit from at 
least some central coordination of welfare and unemployment insurance. It is 
also obvious that a system of state medical insurance needs to be centrally 
coordinated. It is much less obvious that primary and secondary education 
require the all too visible hand of senior governments in order to function 
well. And it is not at all clear why provincial and federal governments have 
to get mixed up in decisions about local roads and urban development. Even if 
we accept Weber's ideas about centralization and bureaucratization 
uncritically, we have not fully explained the state of canadian nn.micipal 
government. 
It seems clear that there is another reason: the nn.micipal folklore and 
the institutional changes produced by the refonn movement, and the loss of 
legitimacy which followed. 'Ihe refonners at the turn of the century argued 
that local politicians were corrupt and incompetent, and they helped to 
establish a conventional wisdom that nn.micipal administration can be irrproved 
by weakening politicians. As nn.micipal political institutions were weakened 
during the refonn movement and in the decades that followed, their 
prescriptions took on the character of a self-fulfilling prophesy. Municipal 
councils gradually stopped making important decisions, and nn.micipal politics 
became less and less attractive to people with the ability and ambition to 
make important decisions. At best it became a way-station for ambitious 
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people on the way up, and an arena for an occasional public-spirited citizen 
with a sense of noblesse oblige. At worst, it attracted candidates who would 
not have stood a chance in provincial politics. Even if the refonners were 
wrong about politicians in the first instance--and it seems clear that they 
did at least exaggerate their case-the institutional changes they inspired 
helped, in the end, to confinn their allegations. 
4. 7 Reaction to the Refonn Movement 
A reaction against the ideas of the refonn movement--a trend away from 
weak-govennnent refonns and a revival of strong govennnent ideas--finally 
began in the 1960s, but by that time the damage had been done and it was too 
late for mere institutional refonns to 
govennnent. 'Ihe reaction against weak 
ideological and the practical level. 
sentiments of many when he wrote: 
restore the strength of municipal 
govennnent took place at both the 
James Lightbo::ly articulated the 
... it is Il'!Y expectation that parties will adapt and respond to the complex 
challenges of our urban political conmumities. Under appropriate 
leadership they may become effective inst:ruments for the reassertion of 
conmumity control over govennnent administration and for the generation of 
a public policy responsive to the demands of articulate civic leaders. (20) 
Li.ghtbo::ly's article was reprinted in a book optimistically (from a strong-
govennnent point of view) entitled Emerging Partv Politics in Urban 
Canada. (21) Indeed, parties and party-like groupings were emerging in 
municipal politics: T.E.A.M. in Vancouver, the refonn caucus in Toronto, to 
name two of the more successful forays. By the late 1970s, even some members 
of Winnipeg's Independent Citizens' Election Conunittee--successor to the 
committee of 1000, the very fountainhead of reaction in Canada--were arguing 
in favour of municipal political parties. Another strong-govennnent straw in 
the wind was the fact that a mnnber of cities were abandoning at-large 
electoral systems in favour of wards. 
But strong govennnent' s knight in shining amour was Winnipeg Unici ty, the 
refonn which was supposed to abolish weak municipal govennnent. In its 
original version--later modified somewhat--it featured a party system, a large 
council elected by wards with the mayor responsible to it, and changes 
designed to ensure council authority over separate boards and commissions. 
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Even in its mc:dified. version, it represented. a major thrust toward the 
establishment of strong-govennnent principles. All of this, as well as the 
widespread disenchantment with it, has been thoroughly documented. in the 
literature. It is painfully obvious that strong government refonns have not 
significantly increased. the authority or legitimacy of municipal elected. 
representatives. Why not? The answer, it seems clear, is that the loss of 
responsibilities and the loss of legitimacy which has reduced. municipal 
government to its present state cannot be red.ressed. merely by party activity, 
or even by that and a range of institutional refonns. If municipal government 
is to have any hope of regaining strength, it needs to be-and be seen as--an 
inportant centre of decision making power. If that were to happen, the people 
and the institutions would follow. Without that, municipal politics will 
continue to be greeted. with the apathy and indifference which it unfortunately 
deserves. 
4.8 Conclusions 
In this section of the paper, I have tried. to demonstrate that the strong-
govennnent and weak-govennnent ideal types, described. in a previous section, 
help us to understand our municipal history and to conceptualize the course of 
that history. In summary, the ref om. movement at the turn of the century left 
us with an ideology and a set of institutions which generally fit the ideal 
type referred. to in these pages as weak-government/separation-of-powers. For 
the next half century or so, subsequent institutional changes were of a 
generally similar character. It was only in the 1960s that there were signs 
of a reaction to this trend. But the reaction was not strong enough to bring 
about a reversal of the trend and today we are left with institutions which 
are still primarily of the weak-govern:mentjseparation-of-powers type. 
The weak-govennnentjstrong-govennnent framework has been set up so as to 
reflect the way in which municipal government participants and observers 
actually think about the issues which concern them, while at the same time 
allowing a more coherent and focused. discussion of those issues. It is 
inportant to stress, at the same time, that the framework reflects ideas and 
theories about municipal government, not proven facts. The various elements 
of the framework should be regarded. as hypotheses to be tested.. For exa:trq_Jle, 
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those of us who lean toward strong government assume that parties, ward 
systems and a responsible executive will in fact produce a government which 
responds more decisively and effectively to social and economic problems. The 
experience of Unicity has not, to put it as mildly as possible, offered us 
much succor. I have tried to salvage our argument by suggesting that 
institutional changes do not--by themselves, and in the absence of an 
appropriate assignment of responsibilities--produce genuine strong government. 
But that is a fall-back position. It is not proof that strong municipal 
government is a viable option in canada. Neither the idea of strong 
government, nor that of weak government, are proven ways of aCC<Jrrq?lishing what 
they claim to be able to achieve. Both need to be continually tested, and 
refined, in the arena of praxis. 
5. 0 THE PRESENT AND THE FOTORE 
History is inportant in its own right. Those of us who are concerned with 
municipal govern:ment are bound to be interested in sorting out the municipal 
past, and trying to understand how and why various things happened. From a 
political perspective, however, history is particularly inportant as a source 
of insight into our current problems and into the ways we may be able to solve 
them in the years to come. OUr framework should be helpful in this endeavour. 
If the weak-govern:mentjstrong-govern:ment analysis fulfills its Weberian 
assignment and meaningfully charts urban political trends of the last century, 
it should also offer some hints, at least, of possible future directions and 
the likely consequences of each. If it does not, we need to take our analysis 
back to the drawing board. 
5.1 Limits of the Analysis? 
At this point someone may object that an analysis which seeks to bring 
coherence to widely held beliefs of the past and present should not be used as 
a guide to the future. We can make the point from a left-wing perspective by 
asking the following question: can a frame work which explicitly limits 
itself to the debates among liberal pluralists of the past century be any help 
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in thinking about a future which we hope will take us beyond the liberal 
pluralism of the past? One possible answer to this question lies in pointing 
out that the framework contains the weak-governmentjpublic-choice alternative, 
which we have barely touched so far in these pages. Not good enough, a critic 
on the left may object: that only means that the analysis is worse than 
merely COIWentional, it lists to the right. It brings coherence to-and 
thereby perhaps seeks to justify--the middle-of-the-road pluralist thinking of 
the past. And the only future it points to--if the future is to be different 
from the past-is one of extreme right-wing reaction. 
It is hard to refute such a line of argmnent conclusively, but it is 
possible to point to an alternative argument which makes more sense. We are 
not short of blue-prints for a better future. Political theory is full of 
them, and most of us have thought about these and have some idea about which 
ones we would like to realize. However, we cannot realize them unless we 
understand the directions of changes now underway and are able to sort out the 
historical forces which remain powerful from those which have . spent 
themselves. An although we have plenty of theories about the future, our 
understanding of the present remains lintited. In these pages, I am trying to 
help organize our thinking about the present, so that we may think more 
clearly about how to realize our hopes for the future. To put the point in 
Marxist tenns: this paper tries to avoid the utopianism which afflicts so 
much political theory; it tries to lay a basis for thinking about how we can 
change the situation in which we actually find ourselves instead of 
constructing a better world out of whole cloth. 
A second point needs to be made in answer to the "left-wing" critique 
sketched out above: left-wing and right-wing ideas are not always as clearly 
labelled as we might think. Warren Magnusson has cogently argued that both 
capitalist and socialist analyses of metropolitan reform share a statist 
bias(22) which--although it has inescapably become part of the socialist 
tradition--contradicts the beliefs of many socialists. He suggests that there 
may be elements in public choice thinking which could save as an antidote to 
some of the statist excesses of both socialist and capitalist thought. 
According to Magnusson, therefore, public choice ideas may well contain 
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municipalities needs to be treated with extreme caution~tario 1 s regional 
governments were also billed, entirely speciously, as devolutions of :power--
but they are worth iiwestigating to try to detennine whether significant 
changes are taking place and whether these could be the start of a trend. An 
equally .inlpressionistic-but also intriguing--piece of evidence is a recent 
article on downtown revitalization schemes in the United States. (23) The 
article gives a detailed picture of the private and public-sector strategies 
which spa'Wl'l such schemes and portrays municipal governments as far more 
enterprising and activist than I would have thought possible. Municipalities 
are pictured as prime movers in the initiation of such schemes, as skilfull 
negotiators and resourceful cutters of red tape. It is possible that new 
challenges in urban development, as well as changing directions in economic 
development, are having the effect of thrusting a new leadership role upon 
municipal politicians and officials. Changes such as these could mark the 
beginning of a new trend toward stronger municipal government ad more 
significant decision making at the local level. These suggestions are 
speculative, however, and need to be iiwestigated. 
6.0 CONCLUSIONS 
In these pages, I have set out a frame work for the analysis of urban 
ideology and m:ban organization which is designed to promote a more coherent 
and focused discussion of the issues surrounding changes in urban organization 
over the past century. The paper uses the framework to organize a discussion 
of municipal history in canada and to broach some current issues. The 
discussion shows that the framework does sel:Ve its purpose of helping to 
explain our history and understand our current situation. The argument is 
presented in tenns of my biases in favour of strong municipal government, but 
the weak-government/strong-government analysis is not intended as a tool for 
promoting my point of view. It is equally possible to put forward an argument 
in favour of either of the weak-government positions. Indeed, part of the 
usefulness of the framework is that it allows each position to be tested 
against the evidence. Standard strong-government arguments, for exarrple, were 
tested against the experience of Winnipeg Unicity, and the result was that the 
strong-government argument was elaborated and modified somewhat to highlight 
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the importance of responsibilities as well as government structures. In the 
end, it is less important to win arguments than to increase our understanding 
and our ability to make Uiban government work for us. 
Two of the major conclusions in these pages are worth reiterating. The 
first has to do with our municipal history and the second relates to our 
current situation. l) canadian municipal government is caught up in a long-
tenn. trend toward weak government of the separation-of-powers variety. This 
trend has not been reversed by such recent refonns as Winnipeg Unicity. 2) 
The trend is probably impossible to reverse unless it begins with an expansion 
of the responsibilities of municipal government. Further institutional 
tinkering, by itself, is unlikely to contribute significantly to a revival of 
municipal government's badly battered legitimacy. But a revival based on 
expanded responsibilities is not out of the question. Some early signs that 
it may be on the way are well worth further investigation. 
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APPENDIX 
'!HE IDEAL TYPES: A SUMMARY 
STRONG GOVERNMENT 
Pluralist 
Social Democratic 
Responsible Government 
WEAK GOVERNMENT 
Pluralist 
'Ihe less Government 'Ihe Better 
Fragmentation/Division of 
Optimistic View of Government Pessimistic View of Government 
STRONG GOVERNMENT 
large Council 
Ward System 
Mayor Responsible to 
Council 
Partisan 
Council in Control 
Strong Mayor 
SEPARATION OF 
POWERS 
(COMPROMISE 
rosmaN) 
Small Council 
At-large Elections 
RJBLIC CHOICE 
Fragmentation 
Duplication 
Mayor Elected at large Competition 
Non-Partisan 
Separate Boards 
Strong Mayor 
Non-Partisan 
Separate Boards 
Strong Administration Strong Administration Administration 
confined to 
narrowly defined 
tasks 
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